A new GLO Discussion Paper finds for Italy that “places that don’t recover” after events like an earthquake can become populist hotbeds.
The Global Labor Organization (GLO) is an independent, non-partisan and non-governmental organization that functions as an international network and virtual platform to stimulate global research, debate and collaboration.
Author Abstract: The recent literature on the determinants of populism has highlighted the role of long-term trends of progressive isolation and prolonged economic stagnation in engendering discontent and, in turn, demand for political change. We investigate, instead, the potential of unanticipated local shocks in shaping the ‘geography of discontent’. Using comprehensive data at a fine spatial scale and a comparative natural experiment approach, we document that the occurrence of two destructive earthquakes in Italy resulted in sharply diverging electoral outcomes: while the 2012 Emilia quake did not alter voting behaviour, the 2009 L’Aquila earthquake paved the way for an impressive and persistent surge in right-wing populism in the most affected areas. Such heterogeneous patterns mainly originate from a stark contrast in post-disaster reconstruction processes and shifts in institutional trust. Our findings are consistent with the idea that not only “places that don’t matter”, but also “places that don’t recover”, can become populist hotbeds.
A new paper published in the Journal of Population Economics finds by comparing twins and close siblings in Swedish register data that the negative association between human capital and fertility mostly reflects family background factors.
The Global Labor Organization (GLO) is an independent, non-partisan and non-governmental organization that functions as an international network and virtual platform to stimulate global research, debate and collaboration.
How family background shapes the relationship between human capital and fertility by Francis Kramarz, Olof Rosenqvist & Oskar Nordström Skans
Published ONLINE FIRST 2021: Journal of Population EconomicsOPEN ACCESS.
Author Abstract: Many previous studies have shown that skilled and educated women have fewer children. By comparing twins and close siblings in Swedish register data, we show that the negative association between human capital and fertility mostly reflects family background factors. For males, human capital measures are unrelated to fertility in the overall population, but this again masks the influence of family background factors as high-skilled males tend to have more children than their less-skilled twins or siblings. Hence, family background factors have a strong negative impact on the overall association between human capital measures and fertility for both women and men. Non-cognitive abilities deviate from these patterns—these abilities remain strongly complementary to fertility both within and across families. Our results can be reconciled with a stylized model where family-specific preferences for fertility are shared across generations and shape investments in skills and traits when children are young.
The Journal of Population of Economicsis an international quarterly that publishes original theoretical and applied research in all areas of population economics, household economics, and human resources. This report contains information about the Journal and its editorial process in the past year and some earlier years.
Figure 1: Number of Submissions
The number of submissions has substantially increased over recent years (Figure 1). Between 2011 and 2013, the Journal received about 400 submissions per year; by 2016 the number of submissions neared 500, and in 2020, 871 manuscripts were received. This marks an annual increase of submissions of 41%. Over the decade 2010-2020, the manuscript inflow rose from 337 to a level 2.6 times higher. The additional workload was managed through an efficient desk rejection policy for initial screening.
Figure 2: Origin of Submissions
In line with past years, the largest single share of submissions made in 2020 were from corresponding authors based in Europe (Figure 2). Nearly 40% of all submissions originated from Europe, and over one-third (34%) of submissions came from authors based in Asia and the Middle East. Under one-fifth (17%) of submissions came from authors based in North America. The remaining submissions came from contributors from Africa (6%), Oceania (Australia and New Zealand; 4%), and South and Central America (4%).
Figure 3: Visits by World Region 2019
Figure 3 contains the internet visits to the Journal on the Springer website from the world regions. With over a third of visits coming from North America and 29% from Europe, followed by the Asia-pacific region (22%), the Journal is globally accessed and read.
Figure 4: Days to First Decision
Figure 4 shows that the average number of days between submission and first decision has generally declined over time. Despite a slight uptick in the turnaround time for first decisions between 2015 and 2016, which may be partially attributed to the increased volume of submissions, there was a substantial reduction in turnaround time in following years. In 2020, the average time for first decisions was 24 days. The Journal is committed to keep the time between submission and decisions low, including eventual publication. Since 2013 the Journal has executed a desk rejection policy to provide authors with an early signal for better targeting of their work. The large number of submissions combined with an annual quota of 40 manuscripts keeps the acceptance rates of the Journal very low.
Table 1 shows three acceptance rate measures: 1) the number of manuscripts accepted in a given year as a share of all final decisions made in that year; 2) the number of published articles in a given year as a share of all submissions in that year; and; 3) the number of articles published in a given year divided by the number of the previous year’s submissions.
The number of accepted papers (submitted at any point in time) in a given year as a share of all decisions made in that year has shifted over time. The acceptance rate has declined from 7% in 2018 to 4.9% in 2019, slightly increasing in 2020 to 5.4%. If acceptance rate is measured as the number of published manuscripts as a share of total submissions received in that year, the acceptance rate was slightly higher, at 4.6% in 2020 (at 40 manuscripts from among 871 submissions), falling from 7.1% in 2018 and 6.5% in 2019. Measuring the acceptance rate as the number of publications as a share of the number of submissions received in the previous year (2019) would yield a 2020 rate of 6.5%, which is lower than the previous years (7.6% in 2018 and 7.1% in 2019).
Table 1: Acceptance Rates
Index Year
2018
2019
2020
No. accepted / Total No. decisions
7.0%
4.9%
5.4%
No. articles publ. / No. submissions
7.1%
6.5%
4.6%
No. articles publ. / No. subm. prev. year
7.6%
7.1%
6.5%
Table 2 reports the status of papers submitted in the given year for years 2018 – 2020. The Journal’s Impact Factor has increased substantially over time (Figure 5). In 2019, the 2020 published simple Impact Factor was 1.840, and the 5-year Impact Factor was 2.353. The Journal ranked 120/371 in economics and 11/29 in demography in 2019. As of July 2020, the Journal’s IDEAS/RePEc ranking was 77/2,485 (based on the Simple Impact Factor 15.682, for Journals and all years).
Table 2: Status of Papers Submitted in Particular Year
Outcome/Year
2018
2019
2020
Accept
39
35
47
Revise
68
125
81
Reject
522
551
737
Figure 5: Impact Factor
The Journal is ranked in: Social Science Citation Index, Journal Citation Reports/Social Sciences, SCOPUS, EconLit, Google Scholar, EBSCO Discovery Service, ProQuest, CAB International, ABS Academic Journal Quality Guide, Academic OneFile, Academic Search, Bibliography of Asian Studies, CAB Abstracts, CSA Environmental Sciences, Current Contents/Social & Behavioral Sciences, ECONIS, ERIH PLUS, Gale, Global Health, International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS), JSTOR, OCLC, Research Papers in Economics (RePEc), Review of Population Reviews, SCImago, and Summon by ProQuest.
Klaus F. Zimmermann, Editor-in-Chief Journal of Population Economics
Posted inNews, Science|Comments Off on Over 40% rise in submissions, highest impact factor ever, even faster editorial decisions. Report 2020 of theJournal of Population Economics
A new GLO Discussion Paper finds that within the studied period 1991-2015the earnings of overeducated workers eroded at the lower and upper segments of the wage distribution.
The Global Labor Organization (GLO) is an independent, non-partisan and non-governmental organization that functions as an international network and virtual platform to stimulate global research, debate and collaboration.
Author Abstract: The main aim of this study is to analyse the wage returns of Overeducated workers employed in Trinidad and Tobago. To undertake such a study, data from the Continuous Sample Survey of Population (CSSP) for the period 1991-2015 is used to estimate an initial OLS and Quantile regression version of the Mincerian Earnings equations, which is commonly used in the education mismatch literature. To observe the unconditional partial effects of small changes in wage returns of overeducated workers at the mean, the Recentred Influence Function is estimated. The results reveal that if the earnings of overeducated workers who receive low wages, was replaced with that of high wages, then this would lead to a rise, or shift in the returns of overeducated workers, if only their biographical information is considered. The inclusion of their skill and geographic location would cause their earnings to shift further. The shift in the earnings of overeducated workers, when examined across the wage distribution, would tend to favor those who were married, younger, i.e., in the 25-35 age group, who were highly skilled at their jobs. These groups of overeducated workers would experience the lowest wage penalties in comparison to their single, mature, and semi-skilled colleagues.
A new GLO Discussion Paper finds a rather limited role of mental health in comparison to physical health for older individuals’ work.
The Global Labor Organization (GLO) is an independent, non-partisan and non-governmental organization that functions as an international network and virtual platform to stimulate global research, debate and collaboration.
Author Abstract: This paper contributes to the literature on old employment barriers by exploring empirically the relative importance of mental v.s. physical health in determining work. It combines regression and variance decomposition analyses to quantify the respective role of mental v.s. physical health. The data used are from SHARE and inform in great detail on the health but also work status (i.e. employment and hours) of individuals aged 50+, interviewed between 2004 and 2017 in 21 European countries. The main result of the paper is that of the rather limited role of mental health – in comparison to physical health – in accounting for older individuals’ work. The paper also shows that health (physical or mental) is much better at predicting old people’s propensity to be in employment than the number of hours they work. Finally, the paper reveals that, in comparison to women, men’s work is more driven by their health status.
A new GLO Discussion Paper finds that in less affluent transition economies, more workers use involuntary non-standard jobs as a means to escape unemployment, while in affluent economies, interventionist policies are associated with high levels of voluntary non-standard work and low unemployment.
The Global Labor Organization (GLO) is an independent, non-partisan and non-governmental organization that functions as an international network and virtual platform to stimulate global research, debate and collaboration.
Author Abstract: This paper is dedicated to the cross-national comparison of the labour markets of the EU member countries and Albania. The aim is to establish whether or not cross-national variations in propensities of being hired in a non-standard job are the result of differences in national institutional regimes and labour market regulations. An adapted version of the Fraser Index is used to explain cross-country differences in relation to the application of rigid labour market regulation. The econometric analyses indicate that the net effect of more stringent labour market regulation, increase job quality in different senses: in less affluent transition economies, more workers use involuntary non-standard jobs as a means to escape unemployment. On the other hand, in affluent economies, interventionist policies are associated with high levels of voluntary non-standard work and low unemployment.
A new GLO Discussion Paper suggests that exposure to disadvantaged childhood circumstances can exacerbate cognitive deficits as well as cognitive decline over time.
The Global Labor Organization (GLO) is an independent, non-partisan and non-governmental organization that functions as an international network and virtual platform to stimulate global research, debate and collaboration.
Author Abstract: We examine the long-term relationship between childhood circumstances and cognitive aging. In particular, we differentiate the level of cognitive deficit from the rate of cognitive decline. Applying a linear mixed-effect model to three waves of China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Surveys (CHARLS 2011, 2013, 2015) and matching cognitive outcomes to CHARLS Life History Survey (2014), we find that key domains of childhood circumstances, including family socioeconomic status (SES), neighborhood cohesion, friendship and health conditions, are significantly associated with both the level of cognitive deficit and the rate of decline. In contrast, childhood neighborhood safety only affects the level of cognitive deficit. Childhood relationship with mother only affects the rate of cognitive decline. The effects of adverse childhood circumstances are generally larger on level of cognitive deficit than on rate of cognitive decline. Moreover, education plays a more important role in mediating the relationships compared to other later-life factors. These findings suggest that exposure to disadvantaged childhood circumstances can exacerbate cognitive deficit as well as cognitive decline over time, which may be partially ameliorated by educational attainment.
Azita Berar is Director Policy of the Global Labor Organization (GLO), and Senior Fellow, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva.
Appraising the youth uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa. Ten years on, too early to say ?!
by Azita Berar
It is ten years since several countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), were swept by waves of peaceful youth-led protests, longing for economic and social justice and political freedoms. These uprisings, also called the “Arab Spring”, eventually led to the fall of long established leaders in some countries ( Tunisia, Egypt, Libya), ushered attempts of reform in others (Morocco, Algeria, Jordan), and stalled in protracted and violent civil strife in others (Libya, Syria, Iraq and Yemen) where competing external interventions have compounded internal polarizations.
In this Policy Brief, we argue that the transformational impact of the “Arab Spring” process is more complex, global and open-ended than is generally acknowledged. ____________________
It has become a common practice, especially on anniversaries such as this one, to revisit the original demands that drove the Arab uprisings at the end of 2010 and throughout 2011 and to measure the progress achieved. But could we or should we assess the outcomes of revolutions, social movements and uprisings by establishing a balance sheet to score successes and failures? To identify winners and losers? Could we attribute responsibilities for these diverging and complex outcomes in different settings?
Ten years on,- notwithstanding the specific circumstances and dynamics in each country-, the impressions of an unfinished agenda, of an aborted revolution, of stagnation or even backpedaling predominate. These sentiments have replaced the worldwide jubilation, admiration and support that poured then into the symbolic seeds of these youthful uprisings: Sidi Bouzid in Tunisia, the town of M. Bouazizi’s tragic self-immolation and the Tahrir Square in Cairo, Egypt.
There are many outstanding questions regarding the “Arab Spring”. There is still an unsettled debate for example as how to qualify these uprisings: social movement, political revolt, revolution or any other denomination?
Regarding the substance of claims that filled the placards carried by young protestors across the region, the twin themes of “Freedom and Equity” predominated, revealing a mix of deeply rooted political, economic and social grievances.
Chief amongst the socio-economic grievances voiced by young women and men throughout the region, was the demand for “jobs”, more precisely, for “decent work”. The desperate self-immolation of Abu Azizi, a young street vendor in the small town of Sidi Bouzid, which sparked the waves of protests in Tunisia, was symbolic on more than one count. It epitomized the plight of the informal economy, the only source of jobs and livelihoods for a majority of the workforce, in all the dimensions of precarity and insecurity associated with it. The eldest son of a family of disenfranchised small land-owner, he had to abandon his early efforts of farming and after multiple attempts to find decent formal jobs in the town he had come to settle in, he resorted to selling vegetable and fruits on a cart, with funds borrowed, to cater for himself and the family of six. He also had to struggle all along to finish his own schooling and have his siblings go to school. As a street vendor, he was subject to continuous harassment by local authorities on various grounds including for presenting a permit that later was confirmed that he did not need. The situation of informal economy workers is not much different today. Informality is on the rise with the continued youth employment crisis in the region. The COVID-19 induced economic slowdown has increased poverty including working poverty. The various relief and compensation packages, seldom take into account work and income losses and access to health and social protection of those who live and work in conditions of informality.
The tragic event also gave a human face to the millions of young women and men in the region, who each year, upon finishing school, struggle to find a decent job and a meaningful place in the society. Ten years on, youth unemployment rates remain as stubbornly high, in all of the MENA region, as a decade ago; sadly, the highest in the world[1]. Difficulties in school to work transitions affect all strokes of youth including the university graduates. The “decent work” deficits are also manifest in more significant indicators, such as high incidence of inactivity and discouraged labour and low pay jobs amongst youth. Across all these indicators, youth are affected disproportionately, compared to their relative weight in the population and young women consistently, at a higher disadvantage. The gender gap is significant signaling pervasive segregation and discrimination in numerous sectors. In addition, women shoulder a disproportionate share of unpaid care labour, in view of the limited availability of affordable and accessible social infrastructure for child and elderly care.
While the demographics in the region, in particular the youth bulge, explain the pressure on labour markets, they do not excuse the poor performance in youth transitions. There is a collective political responsibility of policy actors in public and private spheres in the region for, gradually but surely, missing out on the short and irreversible window of opportunity that the “youth dividend” represents. The same dividend that many analysts consider, as a key success factor in promoting the “East Asian Tigers”’ economic miracle[2].
Despite all the soul-searching that was undertaken in the wake of youth protests a decade ago, internally, as well as by international institutions and development partners, the main course of economic and social strategies, have not changed fundamentally.
Scholars of the region had pointed then to the gaps and needed direction of change to deliver on more and better job-friendly and inclusive outcomes. The kinds of structural changes in economic strategies that were advocated, such as supporting an endogenous Research and Innovation (R&I) capacity and a genuine industrial policy redressing the exclusionary nature of current privatization policies, as well as better negotiating terms of integration in the global economy, have not been followed suit.
The discursive mea culpa of international financial institutions for the neglect of the social and human side of the equation[3] , was not followed through either with action or support for the adoption of alternative macro-economic frameworks.[4]
Whilst in the first few years after the uprisings, the region saw a flurry of projects and increased development cooperation dedicated to youth employment, gender equality and in support of reform and inclusion agendas, these did not amount to a significant change in policy priorities and approaches. Investments in access to health, in quality education, in inclusive skills’ training opportunities and for extending capacities for implementation and institutional development have not matched the needs. Even in Tunisia which, by all accounts, has had a most peaceful and successful transition to date , thanks to the strength of its social institutions[5], policy reform and implementation have become captive of protracted consultations, political balancing and frequent changes in ministerial assignments.
On the objective of democratization, the score may seem even weaker, and the space that was created and occupied seem to have closed or significantly shrunk. Aside from the Tunisian exception, elsewhere coercive measures and repression, and sometimes, serious breaches of human rights, seem to have won over. The no-choice policy narrative of “radical Islamism” or “autocracy” prior to the Arab uprisings is gradually replaced by another no-choice, that of either “chaos” or “autocracy”.
However, it will be wrong to limit the legacy of the Arab Spring to these considerations, as fundamental as they are. The unmet aspirations have not de-legitimized the original drive. The acquired experience of new citizenship rights, of holding the rulers accountable and the claims of “dignity”, “justice” and other non-quantifiable transformational values, awakened by the 2010-2011 protests, are vivid. The more recent rounds of protests in Sudan, Algeria, Lebanon, show that these demands and expectations, resurface recurrently and occupy the space that can be occupied. Each time, the agenda of demands is pushed into new spaces and in more creative ways.
Finally, shouldn’t we look at “Arab Spring”, its triggers and outcomes, by situating it more globally ? Most people analyze the “Arab Spring” through an “essentialist” lens, explaining its rise and demise from the specific historical and geopolitical conditions in Middle East and North Africa. There is another perspective to consider: that of the chain of protests against inequalities and backlashes of globalization that have sparked indifferent geographies and succeeded each other throughout the last decade.
We should recall that the youth uprisings in MENA followed shortly the 2008 global economic financial crisis that caused global recession and slowdown, with massive impacts on jobs. The global crisis was revelatory of another, that of an unprecedented youth employment crisis. The “Arab spring” was preceded by the 2009 “Green Uprising” in Iran, and followed by numerous bouts of similar protests on the other shores of the Mediterranean and beyond. Such as those by the “Indignados” starting in Spain, or “Occupy Wall Street” for example, that developed in the following months and years and spread worldwide. The reference by the “Occupy” movement to the “Tahrir moment”[6], clearly shows the catalytic role that the “Arab Spring” played in the string of social protests movements in the early years of the decade.
While the local dynamics and demands differed, there were several common denominators amongst these youth-led leaderless movements. First, was a loud outcry against inequalities and neo-liberal policies that shaped the globalization, in particular for failing to deliver on the goals of full and decent employment and on social inclusion and mobility agendas. Another common demand was the quest for new forms of participatory democracy and for creating new forms of local empowerment as a means to rebuild trust in the institutions. Unsurprisingly, in the midst of another global crisis, that of COVID-19, these demands have re-emerged creating a new momentum for paradigm shifts.
The Arab Spring also acted as a catalyst to the emergence of yet another phenomenon, that of “youth agency” in global governance. Several international resolutions and calls for actions spearheaded by the United Nations System were adopted in direct response to the youth employment crisis[7] revealed by the 2008 financial crisis and echoed through the 2010-2011 “Arab Spring”. Ever since, inviting youth as a distinct stakeholder in the policy conversation and promoting youth voice and engagement in consultative and advisory formats, in various forums related to sustainable development or to peace building agendas has become a new standard pattern. The organization and institutionalization of numerous youth fora along global, regional and national policy making conferences, the growth of new youth-led or youth-centered organizations in all regions and their engagement by multiple stakeholders, governments, private sector, civil society and academia, show the road traveled in less than a decade.
Ten years is a short period in a historical perspective.But what is an adequate time frame to appraise the impact of the “Arab Spring” ? There is a famous quote attributed to the Chinese premier Zhou Enlai. When asked in early 1970’s about the influence of the French Revolution, he is reputed to have said: ‘Too early to say!’
The 2010-2020 decade joins two major global crises. The 2008 global financial crisis followed by the austerity policies adopted since 2010, and the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. These crises triggered massive social and economic meltdowns, waves of social and political protests and alternative ideas looking into the future. In this broader perspective, how to appraise the impact of the “Arab Spring”, in the region and globally ? Certainly in more complex terms and it is “Too early to say”. __________________
[1] In 2020, the youth unemployment rate in North Africa stood at 30 percent compared to the world average of 13,6 percent. For all indicators, see various editions of ILO, Global Employment Trends for Youth. [2] There is a growing body of empirical evidence on the subject since the original work by D.E. Bloom & J.G. Williamson, Demographic Transitions and Economic Miracles in Emerging Asia, was published in 1997. [3] Momani, B and Lanz, D (2014) Shifting IMF Policies Since the Arab Uprisings, Centre for International Governance Innovation, Policy Brief no. 34. [4] Mohammed Mossallam, The IMF in the Arab world: Lessons unlearnt, SOAS, University of London, December 2015. [5] The Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet composed of the UGTT (the Tunisian General Labour Union), UTICA (the Tunisian Confederation of Industry, Trade and Handicrafts), Tunisian Human Rights League and the Tunisian Order of Lawyers, was awarded the 2015 Noble Peace Prize for its decisive contribution to consolidate democratic gains and a peaceful constitutional settlement. [6] The organizers of the Occupy Wall Street posted in their July 2011 web-post: Are you ready for a “Tahrir moment”? The expression has been used multiple times since. [7] See ILO, 2012 The youth employment crisis: A call for action.adopted by tripartite constituents from ILO’s 189 members. ILO subsequently led the for formulation and launch in 2016 of a Global Initiative on Decent Jobs for Youth, a joint UN system wide initiative and multi-stakeholder partnership.
NOTE: The opinions expressed here are those of the author and not of the GLO, which has no institutional position.
Posted inUncategorized|Comments Off on Azita Berar on ‘Appraising the youth uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa. Ten years on, too early to say ?!’ GLO Policy Brief No. 5.
A new GLO Discussion Paper finds that education indeed affects gender role attitudes in Europe.
The Global Labor Organization (GLO) is an independent, non-partisan and non-governmental organization that functions as an international network and virtual platform to stimulate global research, debate and collaboration.
Author Abstract: This paper presents the first empirical evidence of the causal impact of individuals’ education on their attitudes towards traditional gender roles. We employ two national panel datasets from the UK and Switzerland and a repeated cross-sectional dataset with information from 13 Western European countries for the analysis. The causal impact of education on gender role attitudes is estimated by exploiting the exogenous variation in individuals’ education induced by the compulsory school reforms undertaken in European countries in the second half of the 20th century. We find evidence that an additional year of education instigates egalitarian gender role attitudes equivalent of 0.1-0.3 of a standard deviation. While education’s moderating effect is particularly prominent among women, no evidence of effect heterogeneity is found concerning the individuals’ religiosity. Our findings are robust to numerous checks performed and are briefly discussed for their policy relevance.
A new GLO Discussion Paper finds systemic discrimination in a procedurally fair hiring process using culture as hiring criterion.
The Global Labor Organization (GLO) is an independent, non-partisan and non-governmental organization that functions as an international network and virtual platform to stimulate global research, debate and collaboration.
Author Abstract: Criteria used in hiring workers often do not reflect the skills required on the job. By comparing trainee performance for newly hired workers conditional on competitive civil service examination scores for hiring French public sector workers, we test whether women and men with the same civil service examination score exhibit similar performance in a job-related trainee programme. Both the civil service examination and trainee scores contain anonymous and non-anonymous components that we observe separately. We find that by the end of the trainee programme (first year of employment), women are outperforming men on both anonymous written and non-anonymous oral evaluations, a finding that holds both conditionally and unconditionally for the civil service examination results. According to further analysis, however, it is the anonymously graded “essay on common culture” civil service examination that, unlike the other CSE components, disadvantages women in this particular context.
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