This strength also reflects a deep commitment to service. While in 2025, 84% of authors rated their publishing experience with Springer Nature as excellent or good, the figure was 93% among JOPE authors. JOPE authors also stated:

• “The editors managed the peer review process well” (93%).
• “The editorial advice and comments throughout the process helped to improve the paper” (100%).

According to the ABDC’s 2025 Journal Quality List released on March 26, 2026, the Journal of Population Economics (JOPE) has been upgraded from A to A*. This is not a marginal move….

*****

The Editor-in-Chief and the Board of Editors are proud to announce that the Journal of Population Economics has been upgraded from A to A* on the ABDC Journal Quality List, the highest ranking a journal can achieve, reserved for a select group of journals demonstrating truly exceptional global impact.

This recognition is especially timely, reflecting the journal’s commitment to high-quality research. JOPE has been firing on all cylinders for some time, including:

606,400+ downloads in 2025 with over 1,200 submissions and a final acceptance rate of 7%.

Ranked 2nd out of 140 journals in demography (CiteScore 2024, Scopus) and in the top 10% of all economics journals worldwide

Over 50% of articles published in 2025 were linked to the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals: evidence of research that matters beyond academia!

44% (2024) and 79% (2023) greater citation impact than the average journal in its category

An h-index of 91 (reported by Scopus in 2025) meaning that 91 of all published articles have each been cited more than 91 times

A five-year Impact Factor of 4.3 and a CiteScore of 8.7 (both measured in 2025 for 2024) further underscore the journal’s standing.

The A* designation places the Journal of Population Economics among the most elite publications across all business and economics disciplines globally. It is the culmination of decades of rigorous, policy-relevant research on the forces that shape human societies, namely fertility, migration, ageing, labour markets, health, and beyond.

To our authors, reviewers, editorial board, and readers: this is your achievement. Thank you for making this journal a home for the world’s best population economics research.

The bar is high. We wouldn’t have it any other way.

Expanding EU-level issuance is justifiable
by Klaus F. Zimmermann

Public debt in the euro area is high and continues to rise significantly, necessitating a cautious, rules-based approach. Eurostat has reported that the euroarea’s debt ratio stood at 88 percent of GDP in early 2025, with the entire European Union at about 82 percent. There is considerable variation among member countries. Given the current global economic, financial, and political climate, it is anticipated that aggregate debt will increase substantially over the medium term under various plausible scenarios. Consequently, it is essential to rebuild fiscal buffers while simultaneously prioritizing investments that enhance potential growth and maintain support for Ukraine as a European public good.

A novel approach to fiscal management and market liquidity is achievable, though it should remain narrowly focused in the short term. Under the European Commission’s “unified funding” model, the European Union issues pooled “EU-Bonds” under a single label and adheres to semi-annual funding plans. Eurex, the main European derivatives exchange owned by Deutsche Börse, has recently introduced physically deliverable futures on EU-Bonds, offering investors a standardized method to hedge against fluctuations in EU-Bond yields. Provided that issuance remains predictable and transparent, these contracts are expected to enhance secondary market liquidity by connecting cash, repo, and derivatives markets.

Legally, EU-issued securities are obligations of the Union that are used to finance EU programs. The EU budget must be in balance, Article 310 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union requires that revenue and expenditure match. While short-term borrowing on capital markets has been authorized, these liabilities must be repaid in full and in sequence. This approach is distinct from taking on member state legacy debts, highlighting the importance of keeping EU borrowing tied to specific programs and time-limited. Deviating from this approach would not align with European treaties.

Germany has not abolished its debt brake but has constitutionally narrowed it. In March 2025, the Bundestag and Bundesrat approved exemptions for defense expenditures exceeding roughly 1 percent of GDP and established a substantial, multi-year infrastructure special fund. From a conservative standpoint, this approach heightens execution risk and necessitates credible medium-term consolidation. Current experiences already reveal displacement effects: transfers from the core budget into the new fund have created space for non-investment consumption items, effectively crowding out net new public infrastructure efforts and undermining the reform’s stated intent. This dynamic highlights the significant risks associated with the chosen approach and underscores the importance of firm guardrails.

Therefore, expanding EU-level issuance is justifiable for well-defined European public goods, such as defense readiness (including ongoing support for Ukraine), energy security, single-market deepening, and climate-critical infrastructure, as long as it is grounded in transparent program law, strict conditionality, and repayment plans within the European Union’s seven-year long-term budget. With these safeguards, deeper EU issuance and the new futures market can enhance liquidity and resilience without obscuring sovereign-risk pricing; without them, mutualization would invite moral hazard and undermine market credibility.

Expanding EU-level issuance is justifiable. in: The International Economy. The magazine of international economic policy, With EU-Bonds, Is Europe Playing With Fire?, Summer 2025, pp. 46-47. Contribution by Klaus F. Zimmermann. LINK to the complete published material.

Ends;

Die Transformation des Instituts im ersten Jahrzehnt des 21. Jahrhunderts

Die Einheit von Forschung und Beratung. Neuausrichtung des DIW Berlin

Alexander Kritikos, Günter Stock und Klaus F. Zimmermann

“Verbesserungsbedürftig” – so beurteilte der Wissenschaftsrat in einem Gutachten 1998^[1] die empirische Wirtschaftsforschung und wirtschaftspolitische Beratung in den deutschen Wirtschaftsforschungsinstituten, ebenso wie ihre Vernetzung mit den Universitäten. Sich dieser Herausforderung zu stellen, war demnach auch die zentrale Aufgabe des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin) im ersten Jahrzehnt des 21. Jahrhunderts. In diesem Beitrag berichten der damalige Präsident Klaus F. Zimmermann, der damalige Kuratoriumsvorsitzende Günter Stock, sowie das derzeitige Vorstandsmitglied Alexander S. Kritikos von der darauffolgenden Neuausrichtung des Instituts und seiner langfristigen Bedeutung.

Politikberatung sei nicht hinreichend durch eigene wissenschaftliche Forschung unterfüttert, schrieb der Wissenschaftsrats in seinem Gutachten, und machte umfangreiche Gestaltungsvorschläge. Er forderte unter anderem unabhängige eigenständige Forschung, ihre Veröffentlichung in hochrangigen internationalen wissenschaftlichen Zeitschriften und ihre Nutzung in transparenten externen Beratungsprozeduren (siehe Box). Dies war ein deutliches Bekenntnis zur evidenzbasierten wissenschaftlichen Politikberatung auf Basis einer rigorosen Darstellung metrisch belegter Ergebnisse. Eine solche Politikberatung ist zwar aus historischer Sicht kein neues Konzept, sie ist aber angesichts wissenschaftlicher Methoden- und Erkenntnisfortschritte sowie der gestiegenen Datenzugänge und der erreichten Effizienz ihrer Auswertung erheblich nutzbarer geworden. Allerdings bedrohen falsche politische Prioritäten oder Populismus langfristig mögliche Erfolge dieses Politikansatzes.

Das Ziel: evidenzbasierte Politikberatung

Die Politik steht  immer wieder vor einer wachsenden Zahl von Herausforderungen, die permanent neue und gleichzeitig komplexere Gesetze, Vorschriften und Reformen erfordern. Entsprechend müssen politische Entscheidungsträger fortlaufend Entscheidungen von großer Tragweite treffen. Evidenzbasierte Politikberatung hat dabei das Ziel, unter Anwendung der neusten Methoden und Konzepte zu analysieren, welche dieser politischen Maßnahmen gut funktionieren und welche nicht. Um evidenzbasierte Politikberatung erfolgreich umzusetzen, sind bestimmte Rahmenbedingungen notwendig, die Ende der 1990er Jahre keineswegs selbstverständlich waren. Dazu zählen auf Seiten derer, die evidenzbasierte Politikberatung bereitstellen:

• Offene Zugänge zu den relevanten Daten.
• Unabhängige Forschungsinstitutionen, die diese Dateninfrastruktur den wissenschaftlich Beratenden uneingeschränkt zur Verfügung stellen.
• Unabhängige Forschende, die bereit sind, mit diesen Daten unter Einhaltung strenger Regeln guter wissenschaftlicher Praxis zu arbeiten und Forschung ergebnisoffen mit den neuesten metrischen Methoden durchzuführen, die evidenzbasierte Politikberatung erlauben.
• Hochkarätige Journale, die solche Forschung im Wettbewerb und nach sorgfältiger Begutachtung veröffentlichen, und damit evidenzbasierter Politikberatung das notwendige Siegel geben, dass die verwendeten Daten und Methoden und damit die Ergebnisse den besten Standards entsprechen.
• Netzwerke von Forschenden, um Aktivitäten in Richtung evidenzbasierter Politikberatung zu bündeln und zu etablieren.
• Die wissenschaftlich Beratenden tragen somit aktiv zur Gewinnung wissenschaftlicher Evidenz bei, indem sie ihre Ergebnisse in geeigneten wissenschaftlichen Fachzeitschriften veröffentlichen. Nur wer den Forschungsstand gut kennt, kann international wettbewerbsfähige Ratschläge geben. Der Wissenschaftsrat und andere Organisationen wie der Verein für Socialpolitik haben regelmäßig betont, dass diese Einheit aus Forschung und Beratung notwendig ist.

_________________________________________________________________

Box. Evidenzbasierte wissenschaftliche Politikberatung

• „Zentral für die Qualität sind im Wesentlichen drei Gesichtspunkte: Qualität der wissenschaftlichen Fundierung; Unabhängigkeit; Transparenz der Beratungsprozeduren.“ (S. 21)
• „Dem Gesichtspunkt der Unabhängigkeit durch externe Beratung (wird) große Bedeutung zugemessen.“ …  „Interne wirtschaftspolitische Beratung wird in Deutschland weniger geschätzt, da sie die Trennungslinie zwischen Politik und unabhängiger Beratung überschreitet.“ (S. 22)
• „In der Diskussion wirtschaftspolitischer Fragen (sind) ideologische Positionen durch eine möglichst breite und vollständige Palette von Fach- und Sachargumenten zu ersetzen“. (S. 22)
• “Qualifizierte Leistungen in der wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen, insbesondere der empirischen Forschung, bestätigt durch anerkannte Publikationen, sind hervorragende Voraussetzungen für gute wirtschaftspolitische Beratung.” (S. 22)
• “Vor allem aber müssen die Institute Mitarbeitern, besonders dem wissenschaftlichen Nachwuchs, in geeigneten Fällen die Gelegenheit geben, Aufsätze in wichtigen nationalen und internationalen Fachzeitschriften zu veröffentlichen.“ (S. 26)

Quelle: WISSENSCHAFTSRAT (1998), Stellungnahme zu den Wirtschaftsforschungsinstituten der Blauen Liste in den alten Ländern. Drs. 3320-98 Berlin, 23. Januar 1998

_________________________________________________________________

Diese Form der Politikberatung kann von den Instituten jedoch nur dann erfolgreich betrieben werden, wenn auf Seiten der Entscheidungsträger die Bereitschaft besteht, zuzuhören und die Erkenntnisse zu berücksichtigen. Dafür braucht es politisch Handelnde, die evidenzbasierter Politikberatung ein Gewicht geben und die bereit sind, sich in den Dialog mit den wissenschaftlich Beratenden zu begeben. Allerdings muss die Politik dazu ihre Ziele klar und transparent offenlegen, sonst ist eine angemessene wissenschaftliche Analyse nicht möglich.

Das DIW Berlin hatte zum Teil gute Voraussetzungen, die Anforderungen des Wissenschaftsrates umzusetzen. Zwar war die tägliche Arbeit wie bei den anderen deutschen Forschungsinstitutionen stark durch Beratungsaufträge geprägt, aber das Institut verfügte über folgende Aktivposten: die Stärke im Datenzugang durch die Bereitstellung eigener Daten, unter anderem der Volkswirtschaftlichen Gesamtrechnung und des Sozioökonomischen Panels (SOEP), der Zugang zu den zahlreichen Universitäten und Forschungseinrichtungen des Großraums Berlin und die räumliche Nähe zur Bundesregierung. Darüber hinaus gab es mit dem DIW-Wochenbericht ein etabliertes Format für den Wissenstransfer.

Dennoch machte die Neuausrichtung des Instituts auf eine auf wissenschaftlichen Publikationen fußende Politikberatung einen umfassenden Veränderungsprozess notwendig. Nicht alle wissenschaftliche Beschäftigte waren von der Fokussierung auf eine mit neusten metrischen Methoden durchzuführte Forschung begeistert. Die Forschenden des DIW Berlin waren nun gefordert, für ihre Arbeiten nationale und internationale Kooperationen einzugehen, und ihre wissenschaftlichen Papiere bei nationalen und internationalen Konferenzen vorzutragen. Ziel war die regelmäßige Publikation in Fachzeitschriften möglichst vieler Mitarbeiterinnen und Mitarbeiter, d.h. eine breite Beteiligung an der gestellten Aufgabe. Nur auf Forschung oder nur auf Beratung Spezialisierte sollte es – soweit möglich – nicht mehr geben. Bei der Einstellung waren Forschende gefragt, die sich der Doppelaufgabe aus Forschung und Beratung  stellen wollten. Gleichzeitig musste ihnen ein attraktives Umfeld geboten werden, damit sie sich für das im Umbruch befindende DIW Berlin entschieden. Dafür musste auch der Datenzugang für die Forschenden weiter gestärkt werden.

Insofern war die Transformation auf die neue Doppelrolle aus eigenständiger Forschung und Politikberatung im ersten Jahrzehnt mit Reibungen verbunden. Allerdings trug der Veränderungsprozess rasch Früchte^[2] (siehe auch Abb. unten). Gab es vor 2000 im DIW Berlin kaum Publikationen in referierten Fachzeitschriften, die im renommierten Katalog der Zeitschriften des SSCI (Social Sciences Citation Index, eine Zitationsdatenbank der Sozialwissenschaften) gelistet sind, so stieg die Zahl rapide an, von 6 im Jahr 2000 auf 92 im Jahr 2010. Wichtig war dabei auch, dass diese Expansion beim DIW Berlin wie angestrebt von einer breiten Mitarbeiterschaft getragen wurde.^[3] Im Jahr 2020 stieg die Zahl der Publikationen weiter auf 127 an. Zuletzt gab es wegen der Covid-Pandemie Sondereffekte. 2024 lag – auch aufgrund leicht sinkender Beschäftigtenzahlen – die Zahl bei gleichzeitig ansteigender Qualität der Veröffentlichungen bei 108.

Abbildung: DIW Berlin: SSCI – Artikel, 2000 – 2024: Quelle SSCI

Autoren: Alexander S. Kritikos, Günter Stock und Klaus F. Zimmermann

Dieser Veränderungsprozess wurde sukzessive umgesetzt und durch weitere Elemente forciert. Zum einen übernahmen mit den Universitäten des Großraums Berlin gemeinsam berufene Professorinnen und Professoren die Abteilungsleitungen. Zum anderen baute das DIW Berlin als erstes Wirtschaftsforschungsinstitut in Deutschland ein eigenständiges Doktorandenprogramm auf, das DIW Graduate Center, das sich an den Bedarfen einer evidenzbasierten Politikberatung orientierte. Zentral war dabei neben einer weiterführenden empirisch orientierten Ausbildung auch die Vernetzung in die Welt der vor allem in den USA viel weiter etablierten evidenzbasierten Politikberatung, die über die frisch gegründete Dependance DIW DC möglich gemacht wurde. Vor allem das Graduate Center sollte sich als ein wichtiger Schlüssel für den Veränderungsprozess erweisen. Unterstützt wurden diese Schritte durch eine Umbenennung in DIW Berlin zur Identifikation mit der Hauptstadt und den Umzug in die Stadtmitte, um noch näher an Politik und Medien zu sein. Außerdem wurde das Datenservicezentrum des Statistischen Landesamtes (FDZ) am DIW Berlin angesiedelt. Das Institut engagierte sich somit in vielfältiger Weise für den Zugang der Wissenschaft zu den Daten des öffentlichen Bereichs Deutschlands. Mit der Neugründung der DIW econ wurde  darüber hinaus die Möglichkeit eröffnet, Beratungsaufgaben im Rahmen der Auftragsforschung flexibel nachzugehen und neue Finanzierungsquellen zu erschließen.

Gute Wissenschaft braucht Zeit

Die Meisterung der Doppelaufgabe aus Forschung und Beratung ist und bleibt eine große Herausforderung. Was akademisch interessant ist, ist für Politik oft irrelevant. Die Politik sucht häufig kurzfristig Ratschläge zu ungeklärten Fragen, wohingegen solide Evidenzforschung neben guter Wissenschaft vor allem Zeit verlangt. Da die wissenschaftlich Beratenden ihre Ergebnisse in Fachzeitschriften publizieren sollen, müssen sie sich dem akademischen Wettbewerb und der Kontrolle anonymer Gutachter stellen, die hohen Qualitätsstandards folgen. Eine Fachpublikation kann mehrere Jahre in Anspruch nehmen.

Die großen Forschungs- und Publikationserfolge beeinflussten auch die evidenzbasierte Politikberatung im ersten Jahrzehnt des 21. Jahrhunderts mit nachhaltiger Wirkung. So beriet das DIW Berlin beispielsweise die EU-Kommission zur Osterweiterung und die Bundesregierungen zu den Reformen des Arbeitsmarktes und den Evaluationen ihrer langfristigen Wirkungen. Das Doktorandenprogramm hat sich in Verbindung mit den Berlin-Brandenburger Universitäten weiter verfestigt. Die Nachwuchsforschenden des DIW Berlin erhielten Professuren nicht nur in Deutschland, sondern auch in anderen europäischen Ländern, den USA und Indien, leiten inzwischen eigene Institute oder arbeiten in deutschen Ministerien und tragen damit die Standards evidenzbasierter Politikberatung in die Politik. Trotz dieser Erfolge wird das Potenzial der evidenzbasierten Politikberatung von der Politik in Deutschland immer noch nicht voll ausgeschöpft. Die Forderung nach einer evidenzbasierten Politikberatung als Einheit von Forschung und Beratung ist also eine bleibende Herausforderung, die vor dem Hintergrund des steigenden Populismus in Deutschland und weltweit erheblich zunehmen wird.

[1] WISSENSCHAFTSRAT (1998), Stellungnahme zu den Wirtschaftsforschungsinstituten der Blauen Liste in den alten Ländern. Drs. 3320-98 Berlin, 23. Januar 1998.

[2] R. Ketzler; K. F. Zimmermann: A Citation-Analysis of Economic Research Institutes. Scientometrics, 95 (2013), 1095-1112, Fig. 1, S. 1099.

[3] R. Ketzler; K. F. Zimmermann: Publications: German Economic Research Institutes on Track, Scientometrics, 80 (2009), 233-254, S. 20.

FURTHER READINGS

• DIW. Die Vermessung der Wirtschaft. 100 Jahre DIW Berlin, Berlin 2025. https://www.diw.de/fp/Vermessung_der_Wirtschaft_2025/mobile/index.html
  
• K. F. Zimmermann: Advising Policymakers through the Media, Journal of Economic Education; Fall 2004; 35:4; 395-405.
  
• K. F. Zimmermann: Der Berater als Störenfried: wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Politikberatung, Wirtschaftsdienst, 88 (2008), 101-107.
  
• K. F. Zimmermann: Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Politikberatung: Entscheidungsbeitrag oder Feigenblatt, in: H. Handler and H. Schneider (Eds.), Beratung und Entscheidung in der Wirtschaftspolitik. Industriewissenschaftliches Institut, Wien, 2008, 11-20.
  
• K. F. Zimmermann: Prognosekrise: Warum weniger manchmal mehr ist, Wirtschaftsdienst, 2 (2009), 86-90.
  
• K. F. Zimmermann: Evidenzbasierte Politikberatung, DIW-Vierteljahrshefte, 80:1 (2011) Jubiläumsheft, 23-33.
  
• K. F. Zimmermann: Evidenzbasierte wissenschaftliche Politikberatung, Schmollers Jahrbuch, 134:3 (2014), 259-270. Also IZA Standpunkte Nr. 74, September 2014.
  
• K. F. Zimmermann: Lobbyisten der Wahrheit, Deutsche Universitätszeitung (DUZ), 3 (2015), 14-15.
  
• K. F. Zimmermann: More global solidarity will also provide higher well-being. In: A Symposium of Views. Why is Populism On the Rise and What Do the Populists Want? The International Economy. Winter 2019. S. 33.
  
• K. F. Zimmermann: Wissenschaftliche Politikberatung als Herausforderung, in Wirtschaftliche Freiheit. Das ordnungspolitische Journal, 22 June 2022.

Klaus F. Zimmermann

Chinese President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Qiang, European Council President António Costa and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen are scheduled to attend the China-European Union leaders’ meeting in Beijing on Thursday, marking 50 years of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Beijing and Brussels at a time when Sino-EU ties face uncertainties.

Geopolitical distrust on industrial subsidies, cybersecurity and the Russia-Ukraine conflict dominate official dialogue, while people-to-people exchanges are far from normal.

The implementation of a “talent mobility action plan” could improve Sino-EU relations, especially because the issuance of new work permits on both sides has not yet returned to pre-COVID-19 pandemic levels, depriving companies, and research and educational institutions of the flow of talents. Re-establishing and increasing this flow is a secure and cost-effective way to stabilize Sino-EU relations and tackle some of the economic challenges domestically.

Demographic disparities between China and the EU are becoming more pronounced. The EU faces an aging population, and its labor markets are struggling to find high-skilled workers such as welders, electricians, nurses, software engineers and AI specialists. Consequently, the shortage of skilled workers is causing delays in orders, particularly among small and mid-sized enterprises involved in exports in Germany.

China, too, faces an aging population. But decades of higher education promotion have resulted in millions of high-skilled graduates, especially in engineering and computer science, not all of whom can find suitable jobs.

These labor-market mismatches, combined with a worsening trade situation, have further complicated issues. Last year, the EU’s goods deficit with China exceeded €300 billion ($350.61 billion), as Chinese exports to Europe outpaced EU exports to China. And reports from the US suggest that supply chains, particularly of Chinese-made EVs, could become even more fragmented.

As such, Brussels and Beijing need to take constructive measures before trade becomes hostage to spiraling tariffs. Talent exchanges could help resolve some of these issues, by diversifying supply chains, mitigating innovation risks, and fostering knowledge and goodwill among trade partners.

Globally, austerity measures in higher education have tightened the post-doctoral job market. But since universities in both China and the EU continue to invest in cutting-edge science, a collaborative program for post-docs offering three-year contracts, renewable once, to young researchers holding Chinese or European citizenships could establish a solid academic base, with funding being equally shared and managed by the China Scholarship Council and the EU’s Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions. Such an initiative would not only create an early success story but also foster professional networks and produce publishable results.

The next hurdle is paperwork. Beijing’s unilateral decision to grant 15-day visa-free entry to citizens of Germany, France, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Austria, Belgium, Hungary, Ireland, Luxembourg and Switzerland, which is set to expire at the end of this year, serves as an ideal confidence-building measure and thus could be extended.

For multi-year postings, a bilateral “gold-card visa” could enhance existing programs like the EU Blue Card and China’s Foreign High-End Talent program, while surpassing them in two key areas. First, holders could be allowed to move between EU member states without having to reapply for a visa, while China could do away with the current location-specific work permits for participating economic zones, allowing foreign specialists to transition between places like Suzhou and Shenzhen with equal ease.

And second, a unified set of salary and skill thresholds could be applied in both directions, benchmarked against each host country’s average wage.

Moreover, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz will likely visit Beijing with a business delegation later this year. Since Germany’s updated “Skilled Immigration Act” has already eased the language and degree-recognition barriers, a “China-EU Gold Card” would complement this, enabling green-hydrogen start-ups in North Rhine-Westphalia or automotive suppliers in Baden-Württemberg to more swiftly recruit Chinese engineers.

For Chinese graduates, the reward would give access to one of the world’s largest single markets and its AI ethics, battery chemistry and environmental regulation hubs. On the other hand, it would help European to collaborate with the internationally competitive Chinese research centers in universities and other institutions, advancing their careers.

While talent exchange may not address all the challenges the China-EU relationship faces, it can accomplish three practical objectives: It can clear bottlenecks by allowing Chinese graduates to meet the EU’s demand for talents; it can adjust the imbalanced trade ledger by transitioning a part of economic activity from goods to high-value services such as consulting and research; and it can foster dialogue through personal connections: scientists, coders and project managers, for instance, who have worked on both sides and are less prone to misunderstanding the other side upon returning home.

Fifty years since the establishment of diplomatic relations, Beijing and Brussels have become adept at managing disagreements. And yet they risk neglecting the constructive potential of their relationship. The concept of a “talent mobility action plan” presents a tangible solution: it can meet genuine labor market demands, alleviate economic concerns among the electorate, and be more cost-effective than granting subsidies or imposing tariffs. Should the summit initiate this process, the 60th anniversary of the establishment of Sino-EU diplomatic ties would be significantly more promising.

The author is a professor at the Free University of Berlin and the president of the Global Labor Organization, a Germany-based world-wide network of researchers investigating the path of globalization.

It may also inspire journal editors in their role to reach good and fair editorial decisions. For this, editorial independence is crucial. “Editorial independence ensures that editors make decisions on manuscripts free from outside influence. As integrity threats grow more complex and systematic, collaboration between editors and publishers is needed, using shared resources and expertise. However, editorial independence must remain central, with transparent decision-making structures and editors ultimately accountable for journal content.” (LINK, Committee on Publication Ethics, COPE).

Landau & Einstein: This is how the story goes.

(Slightly modified from a DeepL translation of the German text below.)

It is said to have happened in 1930 at a scientific conference in Germany. Albert Einstein had just presented a complex new theorem – the room erupted in applause. Who would have dared to contradict the father of modern physics?

But from the back rows, a voice quietly rose.

It belonged to a 22-year-old young physicist called Lev Landau – still completely unknown at the time. Hesitantly but firmly, he pointed out an error in Einstein’s second equation. No defiance, no tone of arrogance – just logical, precise words. And courage.

Silence.

Einstein slowly walked back to the blackboard, examined his own work – and after a brief pause, he turned to the crowd.

“The young man is right,” he said calmly.

“Please ignore my previous statement.”

No pride. No defense. Just the truth.

This moment was not only the beginning of Landau’s path to the later Nobel Prize – it also showed what true greatness means:

Einstein wasn’t afraid to be wrong.

He had understood: It’s not about always being right – it’s about being willing to always learn.

Did the story happen exactly like this ? Who knows.

But its message is clear:

Question courageously. Learn humbly. Search uncompromisingly for the truth.

*****

Landau & Einstein: German text

Source: Wissen macht den Unterschied’s post of June 11, 2025 at 6:33 Post

Man sagt, es geschah im Jahr 1930 auf einer wissenschaftlichen Konferenz in Deutschland. Albert Einstein hatte gerade einen komplexen neuen Gleichungssatz vorgestellt – der Saal brach in Applaus aus. Wer hätte es gewagt, dem Vater der modernen Physik zu widersprechen?

Doch aus den hinteren Reihen erhob sich leise eine Stimme.

Sie gehörte einem 22-jährigen Nachwuchsphysiker namens Lev Landau – damals noch völlig unbekannt.

Zögernd, aber bestimmt wies er auf einen Fehler in Einsteins zweiter Gleichung hin. Kein Trotz, kein Ton der Überheblichkeit – nur logische, präzise Worte. Und Mut.

Stille.

Einstein ging langsam zurück zur Tafel, musterte seine eigene Arbeit – und nach kurzem Innehalten drehte er sich zur Menge um.

„Der junge Mann hat recht“, sagte er ruhig.

„Bitte ignorieren Sie meine vorherige Aussage.“

Kein Stolz. Keine Abwehr. Nur die Wahrheit.

Dieser Moment war nicht nur der Beginn von Landaus Weg zum späteren Nobelpreis – er zeigte auch, was wahre Größe bedeutet:

Einstein hatte keine Angst, sich zu irren.

Er hatte verstanden: Es geht nicht darum, immer recht zu haben – sondern bereit zu sein, immer dazuzulernen.

Ob die Geschichte sich exakt so zugetragen hat? Wer weiß.

Aber ihre Botschaft ist klar:

Hinterfrage mutig. Lerne demütig. Suche kompromisslos nach Wahrheit.

Ends;

The INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY magazine (The magazine of international economic policy) has just published a debate on Is Germany Without Its Debt Brake on the Right Track? What will be the end result of a huge European debt expansion led by a Germany? More than two dozen distinguished thinkers offer their views. See LINK to the magazine and inspect the PDF of the complete set of contributions.

Below is the contribution by Klaus F. Zimmermann, Germany’s planned debt expansion presents both opportunity and risk, in: The International Economy, Is Germany Without Its Debt Brake on the Right Track?, Winter 2025, pp. 21-22.

Germany’s planned debt expansion presents both opportunity and risk.

KLAUS F. ZIMMERMANN
Professor Emeritus, Bonn University, President, Global Labor Organization, and former President, German Institute for Economic Research

The United States’ recent turn toward isolationism is reshaping the global political, economic, and military order. Its shifting stance toward Russia and erratic tariff policies have undermined confidence in U.S. leadership. Beyond diplomacy and security, the U.S. dollar’s role as the world’s reserve currency is now less certain. As global trust erodes, new trade zones and investment patterns are likely to emerge, disrupting long-established flows of goods, services, and capital.

Even if some of the erratic and economically unsound policies of Donald Trump are partially reversed, the global community is unlikely to forget the instability they introduced. This has already set in motion a reorientation of international relationships, with long-term consequences that will reshape alliances and economic partnerships.

Germany’s debt brake, or Schuldenbremse, has proven to be an asset, since the low level of debt is now enabling the country to invest heavily in military equipment and growth-oriented infrastructure. Designed to prevent fiscal mismanagement, this mechanism must be preserved in a structurally sound manner for the long term.

Both Germany and the European Union are well-positioned to leverage the challenges posed by the new American policies to stabilize and enhance their own position. The size and innovative capacity of European markets provide a solid foundation for establishing new free trade zones with emerging economies.

As the issuer of the world’s leading reserve currency, the United States has long relied on global financing of its national debt, particularly from countries such as China and Japan. Europe now faces both an opportunity and a risk in tapping into these financial sources for its own development. It is anticipated that China, among other nations, will strategically exploit these challenges by investing capital in Europe. Germany’s central role in this dynamic process underscores the need for global financial markets to closely monitor its developments.

Germany’s planned debt expansion presents both opportunity and risk. If the spending spurs growth in defense, technology, and infrastructure, the euro could strengthen as markets anticipate long-term European competitiveness. But poor execution would damage Germany’s reputation and shake confidence in the euro as Europe’s financial anchor.

For years, markets have scrutinized China’s debt and political risks. But Germany’s evolving fiscal strategy now deserves equal attention. “Germany, Inc.” still commands investor confidence, but that trust depends on translating debt into innovation and resilience. If successful, Germany can reinforce European stability and help reshape a more multipolar global economy. If not, it risks undermining the very foundation of European financial credibility.

In short, the global economic balance is shifting— not just because of American missteps, but also due to how others respond. Germany’s choices in the coming years will carry outsized weight. Stability in Europe, and confidence in the euro, now rest on its ability to adapt without abandoning the fiscal discipline that once defined it.

The global economy has endured major turbulence due to the United States’ aggressive economic policy of imposing high punitive tariffs on imports to extract maximum economic benefits. True, markets have shown resilience, but only up to a certain point.

The volatility caused by the unexpected imposition of tariffs, sudden rollbacks, and communication strategies largely conducted via social media has created deep uncertainty for investors, corporations and global supply chains.

The very strong negative reactions of international stock markets played a key role in forcing the moderation of the US’ most extreme tariff proposals. The fear of financial instability and backlash from investors contributed to the softening of positions and pushed the US administration toward partial rollbacks and renewed talks.

The US’ trade strategy lacks consistency and economic rationale. High tariffs were presented as a means of protecting domestic industries, relocating jobs and forcing trade concessions. But these measures are expected to backfire in key areas: consumer prices in the US are expected to rise, household purchasing power to weaken, and investment to slow down.

Worse, supply chains that took decades to build are feared to have been disrupted, with the effects predicted to shift global trade routes and investment flows. The broader goals of the policy-namely, reducing dependence on foreign manufacturing and bringing jobs back to the US — are in conflict with the mechanisms used to pursue them. Trade wars undermine global specialization and the efficiency gains made possible by comparative advantage.

Economic theory dating as far back as to Adam Smith and David Ricardo teaches us that international trade enables countries to allocate resources where they are most productive. Even if one country could theoretically produce all goods more efficiently, mutual gains may still arise from specialization and trade. Today’s supply chains reflect this logic. For instance, a single Apple computer integrates components and expertise from across the globe, particularly from China.

Instead of strengthening the US economy, the erratic use of tariffs as a policy tool creates distortions. The belief that tariffs can finance government budgets, stimulate domestic investment and accelerate growth overlooks both economic fundamentals and global interdependencies. What will occur instead are inflationary pressure, reduced consumer confidence, and a more fragile economic outlook.

At the core of Washington’s strategy is an outdated model of economic nationalism combined with a view of geopolitics that treats trading partners as competitors and global leadership as a zero-sum game. The idea that the US can run the global economy like a monopolistic corporation — extracting tributes or concessions in exchange for market access or security guarantees — ignores the complexity of global governance. The US does enjoy certain advantages, such as issuing the world’s reserve currency and having unmatched military power, but that doesn’t mean it should act like a global hegemon.

China is the main target of the US tariff war. But it cannot afford to appear weak in the face of the public confrontation. Direct concessions will damage China’s image, both domestically and internationally. The trade conflict has already escalated to the point where bilateral tariffs are well over 100 percent and, if sustained, trade flows between the two countries will likely come to a virtual standstill.

Beyond tariffs, China holds other strategic levers. As one of the largest holders of US Treasury securities, it could theoretically inflict financial pain by selling them in large volumes, although such a move would also hurt China’s own interests.

Strategically, China may intend to rebalance its economic relationships. Investing in the European Union is one potential path, particularly in response to the US’ export restrictions. Germany, as the economic heart of the EU, offers a possible destination for Chinese capital given its new government’s intention to debt-finance huge infrastructure investments, in case the country (and the EU) moderates its recent de-risking strategy toward China.

This brings regional partnerships, such as the EU-China trade partnership, into sharper focus. These partnerships can serve as stabilizers in an increasingly fractured global trade environment. While the US-China rivalry dominates headlines, the EU has positioned itself as a balancing force, leveraging its commitment to multilateralism and rules-based trade.

By pursuing frameworks currently on hold, such as the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment, and working toward pragmatic compromises — such as minimum pricing on Chinese-made electric vehicles instead of outright tariffs — the EU may demonstrate that collaboration, not confrontation, is still possible. China has already implemented parts of the CAI such as easing financial sector restrictions and addressing forced technology transfers and environmental commitments. Unresolved issues, mainly concerning State-owned enterprises and subsidy transparency, are still crucial. If enforced, they could drive long-needed structural reforms in China, while also supporting free trade.

Considering these factors, what steps can be taken to end the global trade conflict?

A possible solution lies in rebuilding multilateral cooperation. Unilateralism and tariff wars fuel only uncertainty and fragmentation. Hence, countries should return to the negotiating table, not just to resolve specific disputes, but also to renew trust in international institutions and rules-based trade.

Ending the trade war also requires recognizing that global economic power is no longer unipolar. We must accept a world where leadership is earned through cooperation, not coercion. Trading partners cannot be coerced into agreement, and a sustainable global trade order depends on balanced relationships, where mutual benefit, not dominance, guides policy.

Tariffs should be replaced by clear, enforceable agreements that promote fair trade practices while preserving the benefits of openness, and mechanisms to address labor rights, environmental concerns, and intellectual property must be modernized.

The alternative to cooperation is long-term economic fragmentation — slower growth, higher prices and diminished global influence for all. With the right approach, the current crisis can be transformed into an opportunity to reinvigorate global trade and provide a course away from confrontation and toward sustainable, inclusive prosperity.

The author is a professor at the Free University of Berlin and president of the Global Labor Organization, a Germany-based worldwide network of researchers investigating the path of globalization. The views don’t necessarily reflect those of China Daily.

Editor’s Note:

It is evident that Europe’s relationship with the US is undergoing a significant transformation. The continent now faces the challenge of navigating its alliance with a US that is once again prioritizing an “America First” approach while exploring possibilities and ways to strengthen “strategic autonomy.” How will the transatlantic relationship evolve and what are Europe’s choices in seeking “strategic autonomy”? The Global Times consulted four European scholars to gather their perspectives.

Klaus F. Zimmermann, a professor at the Free University of Berlin and the president of Global Labor Organization

The transatlantic relationship between the US and Europe is facing significant strain due to shifts in US geopolitical priorities, global positioning and policymaking style. The new US administration’s approach, which emphasizes “America First,” is perceived as both isolationist and assertively expansionist. Some of the early actions from the new administration have caused international concern. Additionally, US demands for exclusive access to Ukraine’s natural resources and undiplomatic comments about European political developments, particularly regarding Germany, have exacerbated tensions.

This shift has led to major disagreements between the US and Europe over economic policy, climate change, democratic values and how to deal with the Ukraine conflict. Europe’s internal divisions and the unpredictability of American actions are making it difficult to reach a new balance in transatlantic relations. One particularly contentious issue is the tariffs on European goods imposed by the US administration. The president views tariffs as essential to national prosperity and a tool for international influence. While this economic strategy is widely criticized, it poses a direct threat to Europe’s trade-dependent economies and also affects China. In response, Europe is expected to take countermeasures. The debate largely overlooks the fact that while the US has a trade deficit with Europe in goods, Europe has a trade deficit with the US in services.

With the US and Russia moving closer, doubts are growing about the US commitment to NATO and there are fears that an unstable cease-fire could be imposed on Ukraine. Europe will therefore soon be massively building up its military in order to take the necessary independent position.

As a result, Europe is likely to pursue greater independence in economic, military and foreign policy matters. The continent is still the largest internal market in the world after China. Strengthening China-Europe ties may again become a strategic priority as Europe seeks to hedge long-term risks. Discussions about decoupling from China are expected to dissipate, presenting China with an opportunity to enhance its standing and influence within Europe.

See for the other 3 views LINK.

• Refrain from making unrealistic promises.
• Allow flexible international labor and training migration.
• Ensure a consistent and significant acceleration of asylum procedures and grant work permits to all asylum seekers as early as possible.
• Stop illegal asylum seekers at Europe’s external borders and through agreements with key sending or transit countries.
• Those who have integrated economically and socially must be allowed to stay.
• Europe is needed.

Grandiose promises and political disenchantment

Migration policy is always a fertile ground for grandiose promises. Statements like “the borders will be closed,” “all refugees will be sent home,” or “all new asylum cases will be stopped” are made. However, a sober fact-check reveals that such reactions are reckless, premature, or even harmful to one’s own interests. The short-term gut feeling of an apparent solution eventually gives way to the realization that, in the long run, nothing has actually changed.

The inevitable result is frustration and disenchantment with politics. Over the years, German citizens have watched this political theater unfold over and over again. The discussions about the reactions of Germans to the recent political changes in Syria, for example, or about the context of the terrible acts of violence committed by people with a refugee background sadly provide ample examples. Policymakers should not rely on voters’ short memory.

The immigration question is complex, as humanitarian concerns intertwine with economic interests. Without a compass, one quickly ends up in a dead end. Those who need skilled workers cannot afford to alienate entire ethnic groups. Those who indiscriminately deport people risk their own prosperity, as economic consequences such as labor shortages and rising prices inevitably follow large-scale deportations. A nation that betrays its values and interests will not be able to withstand global challenges in the long run.

Thus, the desire to pursue the right policies without being distracted is certainly a sensible approach. Provided it is the right policy and not just a populist reflex designed to oust unwelcome political competition and secure the next election. Good policy provides lasting solutions. Politics driven by rhetoric rather than reason ultimately leads only to voter dissatisfaction.

The challenges of migration policy

Germany needs workers—both skilled and unskilled—not only in the healthcare sector, the hotel and hospitality industry, and technical professions. However, our country is not considered particularly attractive, not even for students or apprentices at our tuition-free universities or in our highly praised vocational training system. But skilled workers who are trained domestically and stay permanently are not only adequately qualified but have also established themselves through language skills and cultural integration.

The formal obstacles to entering Germany as a migrant worker have been significantly reduced over the years. German migration policy has contributed to this. Nevertheless, there are still not enough people entering the German labor market. This has consequences for growth and prosperity. Germany’s poor image as a country of immigration is partly responsible for this, as is the regular behavior of migrant workers, which involves voluntary emigration as well as immigration. The majority of labor market-oriented immigrants leave Germany again. Integration policies must be implemented to ensure that they stay. Because what is at stake is the prosperity and welfare of the entire population living in Germany.

Wrong signals in refugee policy can undermine these efforts. The broader societal debate on immigration affects all immigrant groups. It is not surprising that refugees generally integrate into the labor market more slowly. However, they do integrate—especially when access to the labor market is granted quickly after applying for asylum and when qualification and integration programs are available. In recent years, aside from Ukraine, Syria has been the most significant country of origin for refugees coming to Germany.

The reality is: Without immigration, Germany (and Europe) will age and shrink, while the working-age population in Africa and Asia is set to increase dramatically over the coming decades. At the same time, conflicts and tensions in these regions will also escalate. Given the enormous labor force growth in Africa and Asia, Europe has to expect significantly greater migration pressures—both economic and refugee-driven—over the forthcoming decades.

New priorities in migration policy

Yes, a radical shift in migration policy is necessary. However, the current debate has maneuvered itself into a dead end. Germany cannot realistically protect its external borders against illegal immigration permanently. Asylum seekers are registered—meaning they are irregular, but they are not illegal. The real threat arises when migrants go underground illegally.

Nothing works without Europe: Those who advocate for permanent border controls within Schengen states risk destroying the core of the crucial European integration. Europe must be made migration-proof for the future. European solidarity should focus on establishing and expanding European immigration centers at the EU’s external borders, where asylum procedures should be concluded promptly.

However, Germany will continue to call for a fair distribution of recognized refugees among the member states. To this end, the capacities for the necessary efforts to teach language skills, European values and a rapid integration into the labor market must be made available on a permanent basis.

To meet labor demands essential for economic prosperity and to effectively control illegal migration pressure, an efficient, hybrid agreement system is needed with key sending and transit countries in the Mediterranean region, Asia, and Africa. This involves the contractual safeguarding of a circular labor migration system as well as the prevention of illegal migration and the readmission of rejected asylum seekers. Germany will also need European cooperation to implement such a system successfully.

Klaus F. Zimmermann

REFERENCES

Featured image above: Julie Ricard on Unsplash – rTXKkhHgoVM

• Zimmermann, Klaus F. (2025). Migrationspolitik aus der Sackgasse führen. Opinion Piece in Wirtschaftliche Freiheit. Das ordnungspolitische Journal published on 29 January 2025. LINK
• Zimmermann, Klaus F. (2017). Refugee and Migrant Labor Market Integration: Europe in Need of a New Policy Agenda in: Bauböck, R. and Tripkovic, M.,  The Integration of Migrants and Refugees.  An EUI Forum on Migration, Citizenship and Demography, European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, Florence 2017, pp. 88 – 100.

FURTHER REFERENCES:

• Circular Migration 
• Ukraine, EaP Countries and the EU
• Refugees